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The
idea of an air force branch as part of a clandestine resistance
army operating underground on territory occupied by a strong enemy
may seem strange to many people. Yet even in such conditions,
where the resistance army is operating as part of a wider
operational scheme, various – at first glance – extraordinary
facets take on a concrete meaning and specific aim. And so it was
with the Air Force Department of the Operations Bureau of the
Polish Home Army General Headquarters.
The Air
Section was created in March 1940 (codename ‘Bociany’, later
‘Parasol’). Initially part of the V Communications Bureau of
Home Army GHQ, in 1942 it was upgraded into the Air Force
Department and moved to the III Operations Bureau of Home Army GHQ
For most period of the occupation its chief was Air Force Colonel
Bernard Adamecki who during the Polish 1939 Campaign had been
Deputy Officer Commanding Army ‘Modlin’s’ Air Force.
The
initial task of the Air Section, which was formed from air
officers who had remained in occupied Poland following the
September 1939 debacle, was to evacuate as many airmen as possible
to the west via the Balkans. This soon gave way to long term
planning and preparations for the general uprising, which was
planned to coincide with the imminent defeat of Germany and the
breakdown of her organs of occupation in Poland.
The Air
Section was divided into the Organisational, Intelligence and
Communication Sub-sections.
The
Organisational Sub-section organised the evacuation of air force
personnel and was responsible for arranging safe covers for those
who remained in Poland. All evacuations were halted following the
collapse of France in June 1940.
The
Intelligence Sub-section was the most important part of the
Department. It arranged for continuous observation of enemy
airfields, preparing their detailed plans and photographs. These
were sent to GHQ in Warsaw and subsequently to Polish GHQ in
London where it was passed on to the Allies.
The
Communication Sub-section’s task was to prepare for direct air
communications between France later Britain and occupied Poland
whereby single aircraft would land at prearranged clandestine
airstrips. This idea proved difficult to implement and studies
turned to the feasibility of airdrops. This entailed the
preparation of drop zones, reception parties, signalling etc. The
idea of aircraft landing in Poland was not abandoned altogether
and further planning led to the ‘Most’ (Air Bridge) operations
in 1944. In1943 the Polish authorities in London managed to obtain
support for the creation of Special Duties Flight 1586 for airdrop
operations to Poland. With the reorganisation of the Air Section
into the Air Department of Operations Bureau GHQ Home Army, the
erstwhile Communications Sub-section was upgraded into an
independent department and taken out of Air Department’s
responsibility.
Essentially
the Air Department’s task remained the same, with
ever-increasing importance being attached to intelligence
gathering about the Luftwaffe. The planning for the general rising
also began to take on increasing importance, as these preparations
had to be methodical and long term. This entailed taking control
and making operational airfields in enemy hands. The new opened
Air Department was reorganised to consist of: its directorate,
directorate of ‘Luzyce’ (Warsaw Okecie) Air Base,
Anti-Aircraft Defences, Meteorological, Organisational, Operations
and Two-way Communication sections. There were also Air Sections
at Lublin, Cracow and Radom-Kielce Home Army Districts. These were
directly responsible for organising airdrop reception parties,
sabotage of enemy airfields, organising the landing operations of
Dakota aircraft. Three such operations took place in 1944.
Returning
to the preparations for the capture of enemy held airfields it was
accepted that many tactical objectives would be difficult to
capture when the rising would begin. It was the Air Department’s
responsibility to prepare detailed plans of those objectives to be
passed on to the Allies so as their air forces could bomb those
targets. Plans and photographs were passed on to London in form of
microfilms by special couriers.
The
local Home Army detachments were responsible for stockpiling fuel
near the airfields targeted for capture and cement to repair
runways. It was foreseen that some of enemy captured aircraft
would be put into allied service, whilst runways were made good
for allied aircraft coming in. From 1943 the Operational Section
of the Air Department took on an increasing role in the
preparation for planned rising. That some year the department was
expanded through the creation of a Technical-Vehicle and Medical
sections.
Ultimately
the general rising never took place due to the political
developments outside of Poland’s control. The Air Department
transformed into Air Headquarters took part in the Warsaw Rising
including the failed attempt to gain control of Okecie airport. In
the remainder of the country the air platoons prepared for use to
capture airfields were used to safeguard airdrop reception points,
as well as the landing strips for the incoming Air Bridge
operations. Subsequently these units were attached to the local
Home Army formations for general purpose fighting.
The Home
Army’s Air Department carried out an important service
throughout the years of German occupation, providing the Allies
with useful information about the state of the Luftwaffe in
occupied Poland whilst at the same time preparing its long term
aim of taking air installations during the rising and making them
operational as soon as possible for Allied needs as well as for
the immediate needs of the reborn Polish Air Force once it arrived
on Polish Soil. This service was carried out under extreme
conditions and at a high cost of those killed and captured by the
Gestapo.
Further reading
-
Halszka Szołdarska ,
Lotnictwo Podziemne, czyli dzieje Wydziału Lotniczego KG AK,
Warsaw 1986
-
Andrzej
Przemyski , Z pomocą
żołnierzom Podziemia, Warsaw 1991
-
Antoni
Kurowski , Lotnicy
Podziemia, „Skrzydlata Polska Nr. 30 1981
-
Antoni Kunert
(oprac)., Lotnictwa Armii Krajowej. Raport pułkownika
Bernarda Adameckiego, „Kierunki": Nr. 24-26, 1988
Andrzej
Suchcitz, London |